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1 REPORT SUMMARY 1
1 Report Summary
The overall goal of this research effort has been the development of a software system
which automates tasks related to monitoring and controlling electrical power distribu-
tion in spacecraft electrical power systems. The resulting software system is referred
to hereafter as the Intelligent Power Controller, or IPC. The specific tasks performed
by the IPC include:
1. Continuous monitoring of the flow of power from a source to a set of loads;
2. Fast detection of anomalous behavior indicating a fault to one of the components
of the distribution system;
3. Generation of diagnosis (explanation) of anomalous behavior;
4. Isolation of culprit (faulty object) from remainder of system; and
5. Maintenance of flow of power to critical loads and systems (e.g. life-support)
despite fault conditions being present (recovery).
The collection of these operations is called FDIR (fault detection, isolation and re-
covery). The IPC successfully performs each of these operations.
The IPC system has evolved out of KATE (Knowledge-based Autonomous Test
Engineer), developed at NASA-KSC. KATE consists of a set of software tools for
developing and applying structure and behavior models to FDIR applications. KATE
includes an AI system for diagnosis which employs a technique called model-based
reasoning. The major impetus for this research is the desire to test the hypothesis
that model-based reasoning can be successfully applied to spacecraft power system
FDIR. Our review of the research literature on model-based FDIR has produced no
evidence of previous efforts yielding results proving or refuting this hypothesis. The
significance of this effort, therefore has been the confirmation of the hypothesis that
model-based reasoning can be successfully applied in this domain.
Developing the IPC required extensive testing in a real-time environment. To meet
this requirement, the Space Station Module/ Power Management and Distribution
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system (hereafter, SSM/PMAD or simply PMAD) was utilized. The PMAD bread-
board is a distribution system of space station components built to develop and test
automation software to be used on Space Station Freedom [10]. The IPC was tested
on PMAD using two methods: local and remote. Remote testing consisted of internet
transfer of data and commands between the breadboard, located in Huntsville, and
the R&D sites, viz., Orlando and Melbourne, FL. Initially, the remote testing was
simply a matter of expediency, since it would have been expensive to carry out the
research at NASA-MSFC. It soon became clear, however, that the internet delay was
an important factor in evaluating the IPC, since it simulated a scenario in which the
IPC functions as a ground-based controller of an in-flight spacecraft. Local testing,
on the other hand, simulated conditions in which the IPC functions as an on-board
controller.
The remainder of this document describes in detail each of the important top-
ics related to the development of the IPC. First, a more extensive introduction to
the project goals, methodology, and tools utilized will be presented. There follows a
discussion of model-based reasoning as a technique for performing FDIR. The archi-
tecture of the IPC itself is discussed in section 6, following by an extensive summary
of the tests performed on the PMAD (section 7). Finally, by way of final summary, an
analysis of the test results in the context of the proving the feasibility of the concept
of model-based power control.
2 Project Requirements and Motivation
There are numerous advantages of automating tasks related to spacecraft power man-
agement in general, and control of power distribution in particular. These advantages
are particularly dramatic in the case of future, long mission spacecraft such as Space
Station Freedom, where it is especially inefficient to maintain continuous, manual
monitoring and control of vehicle subsystems. We envision an IPC, in its final form,
to reside on board, and be capable of both fully autonomous and interactive decision
making. Alternatively, the IPC could reside as part of the ground-based automation
software used to assist ground controllers in spacecraft FDIR.
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To make significant strides to realize this goal, the IPC developers were faced with
a number of initial tasks. The first was to classify the sorts of faults that can occur in
power distribution systems. In general, two basic kinds of faults can occur in a power
distribution system that affect the ability of the entire system to perform properly.
One of them is an open circuit, where the source of power is unintentionally cut off
from the load. Such incidents result from inadvertent tripping of a circuit breaker,
or from physical damage to a conductor that causes it to lose electrical continuity.
Depending on the location in the hierarchy where the open circuit took place, this
can disable either only one, or a large number of specific loads.
The second and more significant of the types of faults is a short circuit, which
can cause the electric power flow to bypass all or some of the loads and render them
useless, even though the short circuit may not have taken place within the affected
loads themselves. A short circuit can also have destructive side effects if it causes
large amounts of current to flow in the circuit. For this reason, the faulty components
must be immediately isolated from the rest of the circuit, even if this means disabling
some loads until the condition that caused the short circuit can be eliminated. The
goal is to isolate the short circuit while disabling the fewest loads.
Isolation of a fault has to be done quite rapidly in order to avoid the damaging
heat buildup that occurs when large currents flow in conductors or equipment not
designed to handle them. It is typically desirable to interrupt a fault current (isolate
the short circuit) within 0.25 to 0.50 seconds from detection. These numbers are
representative, but in general, the larger the current flow, the faster it needs to be
interrupted.
Some loads, however, are considered critical in nature, and cannot afford to be
isolated from the power source under any circumstances. Examples of these are power
to an operating room in a hospital, power to a large computer bank, power to fire
control equipment, as well as life support subsystems in spacecraft. For critical loads,
redundant sources of power or paths from such sources are generally designed so that
upon disability of one source and/or path, the other one is activated immediately to
maintain (nearly) uninterrupted power flow. Access to the alternate source of power
can be enabled through the closing of normally open circuit breakers, which establish
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a path from a power source to the critical load.
Electric power systems are monitored at various locations throughout the network,
typically coinciding with the location of a breaker. The monitoring function is carried
out with voltage sensors and current sensors (called voltage transformers, or VT's,
and current transformers, or CT's, respectively), the latter being more common than
the former.
Our primary objective, then, in building the IPC was to automate the tasks related
to power distribution FDIR. As a preliminary stage in this process, an extensive
review of the research literature describing similar efforts was undertaken. These are
summarized in the following section.
3 State of the Art in Autonomous FDIR
The state of the art in power distribution system control can be characterized as
employing one or more of the following techniques:
1. Sophisticated switch gear and other devices for fast local response;
2. Global monitoring using conventional computer hardware and software;
3. Limited capabilities for software diagnosis, control and recovery using mathe-
matical modeling or artificial intelligence; and
4. Promising, but on the whole untested, new directions in computer automation
using parallel processing and neural networks.
The traditional means of protecting a power system has been local in scope. Upon
detection of higher than normal current values from a CT, a breaker will be com-
manded to trip open and interrupt the flow of electricity to the load(s) downstream
from it. The interface between the circuit breaker and the sensor is provided by pro-
tective relays which typically possess a mechanism for sending a signal to a nearby
switching device to trip itself as a response to an abnormal situation recognized by
the sensing device. This is often referred to as local control, because the sensor does
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not have any indication of current values at other locations in the network. The trip-
ping of breakers is coordinated through short, pre-determined, time delays to allow
the breaker located closest to the short circuit to trip first. Such local control has
been the norm for many years in earth-bound power systems due to the absence of a
controlling device powerful enough to combine all the inputs and reason about them.
The clear advantage of local control is speed; being local to the device means
no overhead is incurred as the result of communication to a global controller. On
the other hand, a protection scheme based on local devices is as reliable as the most
unreliable device in the system. A malfunction of one of these can lead to the failure of
the entire system if a short circuit happens to take place within its zone of protection.
Intelligent global control of an electrical power distribution system, where one
decision-making device (a controller) has a global view of all sensor readings, can
provide significant advantages in terms of reliability, economy, and ease of reconfigu-
ration over the local means of control. Information about an entire electrical power
distribution network provides the capability to recognize and isolate faults in the
system with only one monitoring and controlling device. A reliable intelligent power
controller, therefore, represents an improvement in the reliability of the monitoring,
diagnostic and isolation function for the entire system.
Reliability can also be interpreted as correct action in the presence of potentially
incorrect readings (referred to as security). Global control provides the framework for
verification of the validity of sensor readings through comparisons with other sensors
in different locations in the power system, something that local control is not capable
of doing.
Additionally, global control can facilitate the recovery from faults and can re-
connect critical loads to an alternate source of power without depending on the re-
liability of the local relay-type devices, whose failure to recognize the condition can
result in serious consequences.
Third, from an economic standpoint, the cost of a single intelligent device is
generally lower than that of several local devices. This difference becomes more
pronounced for larger systems. Moreover, from the maintenance cost viewpoint, there
is no need to perform periodic maintenance on several local devices. This can be
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a significant advantage in applications such as manned space vehicles where such
maintenance is costly due to the inaccessibility of the devices and the high cost of
labor.
Finally, changes to the loads or to the components of the power distribution system
are typically the norm during the course of the years of operation of a power system.
Such changes must be quickly reflected in the fault detection and isolation schemes
in order for them to remain effective. In the case of local control, this may require
replacing some devices by new ones which are of a different rating, time delay or
even operation mode. Furthermore, since traditional protection in power systems
depends on the coordination of devices in different zones of protection, changes in the
system configuration may require the modification of devices in other zones in order
to maintain coordination. In an intelligent automated global control environment,
however, all modifications would be done to the information that the controller has
about the system, which can be done much more easily.
The emergence of powerful microprocessors have allowed inexpensive global con-
trollers to be applied to this problem. However, the techniques used for implementing
the global control vary and sometimes have significant drawbacks. This next section
will discuss them.
3.1 Knowledge-based Approaches to FDIR
Knowledge-based systems have shown significant promise as global control mecha-
nism. Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to FDIR using artificial in-
telligence techniques: the ezperiential-based and the first principles-based approaches. 1
The first approach applies associational knowledge based on human experience,
captured through various knowledge acquisition techniques. This knowledge can be
expressed logically as propositions of the form:
If (symptoms} then (fault}.
1A more common terminology for classifying these approaches is rule-based vs. model-based. This
is somewhat misleading, however, since, on the one hand, models based on first principles can be
expressed as rules, and, on the other, a set of rules can be said to collectively model a system.
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where collectively this knowledge associates one, or a combination of, sensor readings
to a malfunction, and can suggest a remedial course of action. Several systems using
this approach have been described in the literature, most of them as applications
to space power systems [1], [14], [18], [23], [27], [33], [35], [38]. One of the more
advanced systems based on associational knowledge is FRAMES (Fault Recovery
and Management Expert System), developed in conjunction with the SSM/PMAD
at NASA-MSFC. FRAMES is unique in containing as part of its control mechanism
a means of managing both the knowledge base itself (through a classification of the
possible problems the system can exhibit), and the sensor data that is processed
(through a clustering of symptoms).
While the experiential-based approach represents a significant improvement to
local monitoring and control, they have been known to suffer from certain drawbacks.
Among them is the fact that only faults which have been previously experienced and
represented by the knowledge engineer can be successfully identified. This is because,
being heuristic-based, the reasoning is based on the past experience of domain experts.
If the requisite experience does not exist, or is not represented within the knowledge
base due to the uncommon or unexpected nature of the fault, then that fault will not
be detected. Furthermore, associative systems can be cumbersome to modify when
changes in the system configuration are introduced.
In its original form, the first principles-based approach represents knowledge about
a physical system in terms of structure and behavior under normal operating condi-
tions. Logically, the knowledge can be depicted as propositions of the form
If not- abnormal(ok)then output(ok)= f(input(ok))
where f expresses knowledge about ok's behavior as an input-output function. Re-
cent research on diagnostic knowledge-based systems is relying more and more on
employing the (non-associative) model-based approach. Since the first principles-
based approach was the one taken in the IPC, it will be useful to acquaint the reader
with a more extensive overview.
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3.2 Model-based Reasoning for FDIR
Recent advances in artificial intelligence for developing reasoners for diagnosing com-
plex systems, such as power systems, stress the need for a robust knowledge repre-
sentation for the system being diagnosed. A representation based on the strmcture
and behavior of each component of the device offers, for many, the best solution to
the robustness problem. By structure is meant knowledge of the connectivity of the
component to the rest of the system. By behavior, as noted above, is meant roughly
how the component transfers (a set of) inputs into (a set of) outputs. Behavioral
models can be of two broad kinds: either correct behavior models or fauIt models.
As indicated, correct models model the proper functioning of a device, whereas fault
models describe common ways in which a component can misbehave. Fault models
are considered attractive because they provide a way of incorporating some of the
experiential knowledge provided by experts into the knowledge base, and also pro-
vide a more detailed explanation of failure than correct models can often provide.
Knowledge about structure and behavior can be encapsulated into a object-based
framework, where the connectivity of the objects in the framework exactly reflects
the connectivity of the objects in the system being modeled.
In the IPC, structure and (normal) behavior models are used by the reasoner to
simulate the performance of the actual system. Inputs are fed into the model which
correspond to the inputs to the actual system. These values are propagated, using
structural and behavioral knowledge, throughout the model to a set of outputs, which
correspond to sensor readings at those points. By this method, the system can predict
these readings based on knowledge of the inputs.
The ability to predict using structure and behavior knowledge is the basis of model
based diagnosis. More specifically, the discrepancies between observed and predicted
values drive the diagnostic reasoner. The reasoner attempts to find the smallest set
of components whose failure would explain the discrepancies between prediction and
observation. Logically, the problem is to maintain the consistency of the knowledge,
including the current observations. The computational complexity of maintaining the
consistency of knowledge is, in the worst case, not something any algorithm can do
(i.e., the problem is undecidable), and in general a difficult computational problem;
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hence, it is important for automated reasoners to have a mechanism for guiding and
controlling the search for a solution.
In general, the model-based diagnostic process is often viewed as having three
parts: first, generating a set of possible suspects, testing each suspect, either individ-
ually or in sets, and discriminating among the suspects that remain after the final
test. The generation phase uses the structural knowledge about the system to col-
lect components that might have caused the discrepancy. A variation of this method
employs fault models of each suspect which can be applied by the simulator to see
if the faulty behavior can be reproduced. The discrimination phase often involves
performing additional measurements to further reduce the suspect list.
One approach (constraint suspension [5]) for combining generation and test is
to view each component's normal behavior as setting constraints on the behavior
of the entire system. Then abnormal behavior (i.e., when one or more component
is a suspect) is the case where the component's constraints on the whole system is
unknown. This case can be simulated by removing the constraint knowledge from
the knowledge base; if the inconsistency in the knowledge is thereby removed, that
component is the sole cause of the failure.
A diagnosis can be viewed as a set of components which explain all the cop't_c)_s
in the knowledge, where a c_Dt is a set of components at least one of which _must
be malfunctioning, given the knowledge. One common preference criteria for ranking
diagnoses, hence improving the search space, is in terms of mininality: this says
that the most common failures are to a small number of components. A special
case of this is the assumption of a single point of failure. Other, more sophisticated
techniques for ranking diagnoses use probabilities. Another technique employed to
improve effciency in reasoning is the use of truth maintenance [6]. Briefly, this method
involves recording all the conclusion drawn from the model and observations, to be
reused, without computational cost, in future inferences.
The operation consuming the most computational resources while performing
model-based diagnosis is the use of the model for propagation, either forward for
prediction, or "backward" (i.e. from effect to cause) for the purpose of ditgnosis.
ORIQ!NAL PAGE'. |5
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Techniques like truth maintenance, probabilistic ranking of diagnoses, and fault mod-
els, have arisen as a response to this complexity. The system's behavior is measured
mathematically in terms of the algebraic expressions describing its behavior. Current
constraint oriented model-based diagnostic systems, for example, are "local" in the
sense that they propagate values through one model component at a time, solving
at each stage one equation in one unknown [5]. More complex systems may have
behavior whose algebraic representation consists of equations with more than one un-
known. This corresponds in the physical world to more complex causal dependency
among the components; e.g. mutual dependency or reconvergent fanout (a signal that
branches and then reconverges at a later point).
Researchers in model-based reasoning have attempted to solve the issue of com-
plexity in a number of ways. The most promising, in our minds, is based on the idea
that reasoning in the face of system complexity requires the ability to perform ab-
stractions in order to guide the reasoning process [37]. Informally, abstraction is the
process of focusing on only what is essential, ignoring what is inessential. Two kinds
of abstraction, behavioral and structural, are possible. Behavioral abstraction ignores
certain characteristics components have and focuses on only ones deemed important.
Structural abstraction ignores details related to connectivity of objects, focusing only
on a subset of these connections. Current research views abstraction as occurring
dynamically, when needed, which implies the presence of multiple models of a system
which differ in their levels of abstraction. The reasoner is faced with choosing a model
for prediction/diagnosis, and well as applying the model.
Every model-based diagnostic reasoner possesses three high-level modules in its
architecture. These are:
• a predictor which generates behavioral predictions based on the model, and
detects discrepancies between observed and predicted behavior;
• a candidate proposer which generates conflicts from these discrepancies; gener-
ates candidates based on the conflicts; and discriminates and refines candidates;
and
• a diagnostic strategist which controls the diagnostic process, in general, by
3 STATE OF THE ART IN A UTONOMO US FDIR 11
determining the next step in the process of generating a diagnosis [24].
Predictors typically employ constraint propagation [7], which is the process of com-
puting the deductive closure of the model's knowledge, given a set of inputs. The
task of candidate generation in model-based diagnosis, in systems like GDE [7], views
the computational problem as one of maintaining the consistency of knowledge about
the system.
The discrepancies between observed and predicted values drive the diagnostic
reasoner. When discrepancies emerge, an inconsistency between predicted and actual
values results. The system records the dependencies of the behavioral predictions
made by the model of normal behavior, and determines which assumptions have led
to the inconsistency. The reasoner does this by attempting to find the smallest set
of components whose failure would explain the discrepancy between prediction and
observation. Removing correctness assumptions will eventually make the knowledge
consistent, and the result is a set of candidates, or hypotheses, for explaining the
discrepancies.
The traditional diagnostic strategy adopted for controlling the process has been
the so-called dependency-recording strategy [24]. In this approach, the system records
the dependencies of the predictions in order to determine which of the assumptions
used in modeling the system have led to conflicts. An Assumption-based Truth Main-
tenance system (ATMS) has been employed for this bookkeeping operation, e.g. as
part of the GDE system. The other main approach to strategy selection has been the
iterative search strategy [25]. This involves using the discrepancies to search through
a space of possible variations from the normal model, until a matching fault model
has been obtained.
There are two major obstacles in developing and applying structure and behavior
models for reasoning about complex systems for diagnosis: limiting the amount of
computation required to reach a diagnosis, and building a model of the system of
sufficient detail (granularity) to be useful in diagnosis. One complicating factor is
that meeting one of these two requirements tends to inhibit accomplishing the other.
Solving these dual problems constitute open research topics in the field of model-based
diagnosis. Systems have been developed which incorporate some of the potential
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solutions to the problems, but few, if any, systems have progressed to the deployment
stage. These problems are illustrated in the next section in association with the
development of IPC models.
3.2.1 Structure and Behavior Models For Power Distribution
The structure of a system of components of a power distribution system can be
represented in a straightforward manner. Based on the granularity desired in the
model, busses, wires, loads, switches, loads, batteries, and power sources of various
kinds can be represented as objects in a model. Connectivity in structure and behavior
models is depicted logically as statements of the form
Otttpttt( O 1) -_- input( o2 ).
This statement signifies that ol is connected upstream to o2. In a power distribution
model, (more specifically, to model what is been termed secondary power distribution)
it is essential to include representations for the switches, buses, and loads. More
granular models would include wires or cables, but for our purposes this was not
required. It is also required to model sensors (as components carrying output of the
system) and interfaces with the harware used to control the objects. These are called
in the IPC model commands, representing inputs to the system.
The correct behavior of a set of power system components is characterixed by a set
of first principles which describe the correct functioning of the system. These consist
of rules which characterize the voltages and currents presented in the system circuit.
Voltages and currents are determined by considering the constraints imposed by the
behavior of the components, as well as the constraints imposed by the connectivity
of the components. Constraints imposed by the interconnections of the circuit are
expressed by Kirchoff's voltage law (KVL) and Kirchoff's current law (KCL). These
laws are best viewed as applied to the entire system, or, as an abstraction, to a graph
of the system. The behavior of a circuit can be characterized as a set of impedance
equations and the equations implied by KCL or KVL. In this manner, KCL and KVL
provide the constraints of interconnection.
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As noted, model-based diagnostic systems have modeled the functionality of a
device as a local transfer function that relates its input to its output. This is reason-
able in digital electronic systems, and process systems can be approximated similarly.
However, in electrical power systems, there are complexities that must be addressed
in order for the system to be modeled in terms of structure and behavior. Two such
complexities are:
• A component's behavior is a complex function of a number of parameters (volt-
age, current, impedance) operating simultanously; and
• The behavior of a component is properly described not merely by its input/output
characteristics, but also by the characteristics of the devices both upstream and
downstream from it.
The first problem was solved by the IPC developed by applying reasonable sim-
plifying assumptions which affected the granularity of the model (i.e., the resulting
model abstracted from certain properties that were deemed unnecessary) without hin-
dering the ability to perform its required FDIR functions. Specifically, voltage was
assumed to be constant everywhere in the system, and therefore could be modeled
as a constant value, rather than something that needed to be computed. Secondly,
impedances on the components were deemed too insignificant to contribute to the
behavior of the system; they were also not modeled. The result was a model in
which only current was propagated. Finally, loads were assumed to carry constant
resistance, and therefore was also modeled as a non-computed value. This works for
most kinds of loads; an exception is a fan, whose requirements for current changes
somewhat over time (e.g., requiring an initial surge).
The second problem, modeling global effects of component behavior required more
serious changes to the modeling process. One of the limitations of structure and
behavior models is that the dual concepts of inputs and outputs imply a strong sense
of directionality in behavior. This is not practical for certain kinds of changes to
devices such as changes that result when an RPC opens or closes. Many researchers
in model-based reasoning have been driven by this limitation of structure and behavior
knowledge to seek a solution by representing more abstract forms of knowledge such
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as functional knowledge (e.g., [15]). We selected a simpler strategy which did not
require multiple models.
The specific problem we needed to address in building the model is the modifica-
tions to the equivalent resistance of the network caused by the opening or closing of
RPC's. This resistance must be recomputed in order for the model to predict new
current values at the sensors and elsewhere. The solution required the introduction
of what we termed recta-objects. Meta-objects are used to represent non-directional
behaviors in unidirectional models. These dummy components represent the global
parameters in the system and are represented by mathematical equations that de-
scribe the relationships between these parameters. For example, they represent the
equations needed to correctly recalculate the equivalent impedance of a circuit modi-
fied through tbe opening or closing of an RPC. Thus, when global phenomena occur-
ring within the system limits the diagnostic abilities imparted by the unidirectional
model, meta- objects are employed.
Consequently, from the standpoint of the predictor, behavior can be classified as
local or global. Local phenomena can be handled by the standard input-output first-
order transfer flmctions commonly used in unidirectional models. Global phenomena,
on the other hand, must be represented by deriving an output from a number of input
sources that are not directly (structurally) connected to each other either upstream
or downstream. Due to the multi-directional nature of meta-objects, the use of meta-
objects within the processing algorithms of a diagnoser must be restricted so that
continuous looping is avoided.
Although pursued independently, the meta-component enhancement to the IPC
represention apparatus seems similar to that explored recently by the developers of
KATE [34]. Our opinion currently is that the concept of meta-objects represents
only a partial solution of modeling global behavior, since their implementation still
requires significant amounts of hard coded information about the system. Addition-
ally, the IPC currently has no way of representing variable loads, such as motors,
whose loadings may normally change throughout an interval of time. (This point is
developed further below).
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As noted, research on model-based diagnosis has focused mainly on representing
structure and behavior knowledge, but more recently attention is shifting in order to
consider representing other kinds of knowledge in a model. One reason for this shift is
the need to find more efficient ways of controlling the reasoning process in the effort
of diagnosing more complex systems. Power system behavior is often noted as an
example of a physical system with complex behavior (e.g. [371; [31]). As we'll observe
below, the investigation described here incorporates some of the advances proposed
by recent researchers.
3.2.2 Model-based Reasoning for Power Distribution FDIR
Of systems that employ a normal structure and behavior model for power system
FDIR, Marple [12] provides an exemplary instance. Marple employs constraint sus-
pension as its diagnostic strategy. It handles the complexity in propagating values in
analog system models by using tolerances. It has been applied to actual power system
hardware, and has an 85 per cent accuracy rate in identifying failures to components,
including sensors.
The Marple effort is illustrative of the perception on the part of system developers
using the model-based paradigm that enhancements to the paradigm are needed for
diagnosing more complex devices such as power systems. This perception can be
traced to observations made by the original developers of the paradigm (e.g., [5]).
We will henceforth refer to the time to action, or TTA, as the time it takes from
the onset of a discrepency to the onset of the recovery process. TTA measures the
speed of the diagnosis. As noted at the outset, one of our primary goals was to achieve
a TTA which makes the IPC suitable for real time, on-board, use. It was decided,
for this reason, to find an alternative to the constraint-suspension technique for diag-
nosis. The solution, roughly, involves replacing constraint suspension with additional
knowledge about the connectivity of the system, as well as global assumptions about
the behavior of the PMAD. Applying this alternative seems to have improved the
efficiency of the diagnoser (although quantitative comparisions with the constraint
suspension approach were not performed).
Finally, to adequately control power systems from massive failure, an automated
4 UTILIZATION OF KATE 16
system must implement the ability to isolate components from the rest of the system.
For example, when a fault to ground or to another conductor causes a quantity to be
abnormal, the current will be greater than under normal conditions and the voltage
will decay. If a voltage model is being used, the short circuit must be isolated so
that the voltage can regain its normal level. Additional sources should not be made
available because they would only serve to aggravate the problem by pumping more
current into the short circuit.
4 Utilization of KATE
The diagnostic and control engine is the heart of the IPC prototype. It evolved
from the Knowledge-based Autonomous Test Engineer (KATE), a shell developed for
building model-based diagnostic applications by researchers at NASA Kennedy Space
Center [19]. KATE consists of tools for building structure and behavior models to
which a diagnostic reasoning engine can be applied. The reasoner employs a constraint
suspension strategy. A predictor simulates the normal behavior of the target system
which is compared to the actual performance of the target system itself. The diagnoser
collects a set of suspects by placing in a list all components physically upstream
from the discrepancy. Each suspect is individually tested for consistency by failing it
purposely and suspending all of its constraints. The change is propagated throughout
the system by using the behavioral knowledge of each component as well as a function
which "inverts" the input-output function of each device to set values at the input
of the device based on its output value. KATE also uses inversion to determine the
action to undertake to isolate the failure and to establish an alternate source of power.
KATE uses objects to represent its knowledge base, where a set of slots will contain
the name(s) of the other components connected to its input and output.
The IPC inherited from KATE
1. The object-based model representation, including all the attributes for repre-
senting physical structure and behavior as well as the conceptual (ISA) hierar-
chy;
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2. Some of the constraint suspension-oriented reasoning procedures for applying
the model for control;
3. The basic algorithmic monitor-diagnose-control loop; and
4. Many of the low-level functions and procedures.
The IPC prototype differs from KATE, however, in crucial ways. First, the IPC is
a translation of (the PC version of) KATE into C++. Second, as noted, the IPC
replaces the constraint suspension approach to gathering and testing suspects with
an approach using a combination of structural information and assumptions about
the behavior of components. Second, the IPC implements the meta-object technique,
described above, for modeling global behavior. As noted earlier, these components
represent the global parameters in the system and are described by mathematical
equations that describe the relationships between these parameters. For example,
they represent the KCL equations needed to adequately describe the system. How-
ever, the concept of meta-objects only represents a limited means of representing
global behavior because they include significant amounts of hard-coded information
about the system that is difficult to implement as well as represent.
Figure 1 shows an example of the use of the representation of meta-objects in a
model. Although the frames in Figure 1 (which actually represents part of the model
of the PMAD) looks very LISP-like, it is parsed by the IPC into C++ objects. The
definition of component RPC-P1 uses meta-object META-LC1-PORT to determine
the equivalent resistance in a part of the circuit. Component RBI-P, located higher
in the electrical hierarchy of the system, uses meta-object META-RBI-P which in
turn uses META-LCI-PORT, in predicting the equivalent resistance in a larger part
of the circuit which encompasses RPC-PI. This avoids incurring the cost of using
a meta-object if META-RBI-P used RPC- Pl instead of META-LC1-PORT. In such
a case, the value of RPC-P1 must be calculated before META-RBI-P could use it.
As can be inferred from Figure 1, a problem with meta-objects is that they demand
significant computation, calculating the equivalent impedances every time the model
is run, whether any changes in the structure of the system have taken place or not.
This is especially costly when more than one meta-object is used in combination as in
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(deframe RBI-P
(nomenclature "remote bus isolator (port side)")
(aio rbi)
(unit '!amps")
(source-path (and (cstatus gc-command-rbi-p)
(a//d-cstatus power-p)))
(source power-p)
(status (* 120 (meta-component meta-rbi-p)))
(in-path-of current-rbi-p bus-p))
(deframe META-RBI-P
(nomenclature "Meta-component for port rbi")
(aio meta-component)
(source-path (cstatus gc-command-rbi-p))
(status
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-pl) (meta-component meta-lcl-port) 0.0)
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-p2) (meta-component meta-lc2-port) 0.0)
(if (cstatus gc-command-p3) (meta-component meta-lc3-port) 0.0))))
(source t))
(deframe RPC-P1
(nomenclature "remote power controller")
(aio rpc)
(units "amps")
(source-path (and (cstatus gc-command-pl) (a//d-cstatus bus-p)))
(source t)
(status (* 120.0 (meta-component meta-lcl-port)))
(in-path-pf bus-pl current rpc-pl))
(deframe META-LCI-PORT
(nomenclature "Meta-component for LCl port side")
(aio meta-component)
(source-path (cstatus gc-command-pl))
(status
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-pl02) (/ i 20.0) 0.0)
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-p103) (/ i 60.0) 0.0)
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-pl04) (/ i 15.0).0.0)
(+ (if (cstatus gc-command-p105) (/ 1 30.0) 0.0)))))
(source t))
Figure 1: Meta-Object Definitions
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the above example. Therefore, they should be used sparingly and only within smaller
domains. Another problem is that the impedances downstream from the meta-objects
are hard-coded into the meta:object definition. This can introduce problems when
loads are modified, either dynamically (i.e., a motor has a normal increase in torque
demand when a compressor kicks in), or physically when one load is replaced by
another of a different rating.
A final modification of KATE incorporated into the IPC was the ability to isolate
components from the remainder of the system. KATE has traditionally been applied
to process control systems, whose behavior does not require the ability of the controller
to isolate components; hence, the needed change for the IPC.
In summary, the changes from the original KATE reflect the specialization of the
IPC to use in electric power systems, as opposed to KATE's more general nature,
which allows it to be used in process control systems and in digital electronics.
5 Utilization of the SSM/PMAD
The IPC developers needed to test the system on a near-real time environment to
ensure the legitimacy of their research hypothesis. Consequently, they chose the
SSM/PMAD as their testbed. The PMAD is a direct current power distribution
system breadboard representative of a space station power system. It is interfaced
to computer hardware for the purpose of testing power system scheduling, diagnosis
and control software systems. The breadboard is supplied by two independent de
sources, the starboard supply and the port supply. Each of these are connected to
a distribution bus through remote bus isolators (RBI's). RBI's are switches used for
isolation of the power supplies and are not capable of current interruption. Each of
the two busses supply the power to three load centers, Load Centers 1, 2, and 3,
through 3 kW remote power controllers (3k RPC's). The RPC's are solid state dc
circuit breakers capable of interrupting fault currents. Figure 2 shows a schematic
representation of the PMAD distribution network. Each load center has a number
of loads being supplied by its bus. These loads consist of lights, fans, or simply
resistors, and are supplied from their respective load center through 1 kW RPC's.
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Figure 2: The SSM/PMAD Breadboard Schematic
Each load center has two busses, one coming from the starboard supply and the
other from the port supply. A set of critical loads such as cabin air supply and
emergency lights are fed from both supplies through two redundant paths, so that
if one supply or bus is lost, they can be alternatively fed from the other. The IPC
prototype testing centered around the detection of systems faults, the isolation of the
faulted component in the system, and the establishment of the redundant path to
these critical loads. Since the redundant loads were contained in Load Center 3, the
bulk of the testing was carried out in Load Center 3. Sensing devices consist of current
sensors and voltage sensors. Each RPC contains a current sensor that measures the
current flowing through it. Additionally, external current sensors at various locations
such as the RB1 also measure current in the circuit. Bus voltages are measured, but
the signal received is a discrete value when the voltage reaches a specific percentage
of full voltage. Thus, they were not used, and the current model of the PMAD was
implemented in the IPC prototype.
The RBI's and the RPC's are controlled through a set of networked Lowest Level
Processors (LLPs), which form the interface between the controlling computer and
the switchgear. The LLP's serve to read the sensors as well as to carry out any action
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Figure 3: Intelligent Power Controller Architecture
commands, such as opening or closing switches, directed to the RPC's and RBI's. The
IPC prototype interfaced directly with these LLP's. Since the LLP's were networked
to the Internet system, tests of the IPC could be done remotely from the primary
research sites of Orlando and Melbourne, FL.
6 IPC Architecture
This section summarizes the technical discussion by presenting a description of the
architecture of the IPC. The Intelligent Power Controller (IPC) consists of two main
subsystem, data bases and libraries. The overall architecture is displayed graphically
in Figure 3. The two large subsystems identifiable in the figure are: the real time
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power controller (IPC/RT) and the graphical modeling tool system (IPC/GMT).
The RT consists of the hardware interface, the simulation tool, the FDIR system,
and the real time controller and display. The IPC/GMT consists of a model library,
a model development tool, a simulation tool (which it shares with the run time sub-
system), and an icon editor. The end user builds and tests models of a target system
through interactions with the icon editor. Because the IPC/GMT subsystem was
not a requirement of this contract, and the contract award was not applied to the
development of this subsystem, this document will not contain a discussion of the
IPC/GMT. Rather, in the following subsections, we discuss in greater depth the run
time design of the IPC/RT, followed by sample run time sessions.
6.1 The IPC/RT System
The IPC/RT is driven primarily by user interaction. Its run time environment can be
divided into two modes of operation. The first mode provides the CAD facilities that
arc needed to construct a useful display of a model. The second mode of operation
provides a runtime environment that allows the user to easily interact with the IPC,
and to visually monitor the system.
When the IPC/RT is first executed, the user must specify what model files are to
be ]oaded. Initially, the screen is grey, with only two menu options available under
the button File on the main menu bar. The user can either load a model, or exit
the IPC/RT. Once the user loads a model, the system follows the actions shown in
Figure 4. This figure shows how the parser begins the process of translating the model
information into the iconic display. Once the model has been parsed, the IPC/RT
displays the objects on the screen, along with any relevant connections.
The actions the user may perform in the two operating modes are implicitly mu-
tually exclusive. On the runtime side the user should not be able to modify the layout
of the screen. In this mode, the user is only interested in issuing commands to the
IPC and viewing the results. On the CAD side, the user should not be able to issue
any runtime commands, but should be able to modify the screen as well as the model.
There is no impact of screen changes during a runtime session.
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Figure 4: Program Flow for Load Model
6.1.1 CAD Facilities Overview
Once a model is displayed on the screen, the IPC/RT enables many of the other facil-
ities for the user. Initially, the IPC/RT is in the CAD mode of operation. The Xview
Notifier, a process for retrieving data from file descriptors, handles all system activ-
ities, including user interactions, and communicating with other systems. Figure 5
shows the role of the Notifier.
The CAD environment implements the following facilities:
• The CAD mode allows the user to customize the arrangement of icons on the
display. The user selects an object to be repositioned with the left mouse button,
and while holding the button down, drags the icon to the desired position. The
connections associated with the icon will automatically be updated when the
user releases the left mouse button.
6 IPC ARCHITECTURE 24
IPC/GMT
Communications
Notifier
Mouse Events
Select Button I
[Mov_Object[
[Update Connections ]
IPC
Communications
Menu Button I
I  !Icons]
1
I_Edit Connections [
Hide Icon 1and Connections
Figure 5: IPC/RT CAD Facilities
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• The user is also able to edit the icons to be used by an object. Multiple icon
pixmaps can be specified, along with attributes specific to each of them. These
icon attributes are edited by the user through a dialog box.
• The CAD mode of operation also allows the user to edit the attributes of each
connection associated with an object. The attributes of each connection are
edited by the user through a dialog box.
• Lastly, while in the CAD mode, it is possible to have another support tool
contending for write permissions on the model data files. The Notifier warns
the user of any contentions with other systems. The IPC/RT is considered
a server in terms of communications, and any other support tools are clients.
These clients may at times need to modify the model files, and precautions are
taken to prevent losing edits made by the user in the IPC/RT CAD mode.
The editing functions in the CAD mode are accessable through a set of menu but-
tons, starting with the top-level mode button, which allows the user to enter the
editing mode, and progressing through the set of editing buttons corresponding to
the functions just listed.
6.1.2 Runtime Facilities Overview
The runtime facilities allow the user to easily control and monitor the IPC. Once
a runtime session is initiated through the main menu bar, the Notifier serves many
different roles. Figure 6 depicts the activities of the Notifier.
The runtime environment implements the following facilities:
• Four text windows are provided for monitoring the output of the IPC. They
comprise the following:
1. A warning window which receives messages that are intended to attract
the attention of the IPC developer. Warnings indicate events such as a
fault being detected in the system;
2. A recovery window which receives the names of the objects that are recov-
ered after the FDIR process is completed;
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Figure 6: IPC/RT Runtime Facilities Overview
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3. A general window which receives messages that are important to the IPC
developer, but cannot be classified as a warning; and
4. A main window which displays the raw output of the IPC.
• The user is able to use the mouse to interact with the IPC/RT. The left button
of the mouse issues control commands to the IPC. If the icon being clicked on
is a control function, called a GC-COMMAND, the Notifier will send a message
to the IPC to toggle the state of the object;
• The right mouse button, which is the menu button, also gives the user a different
menu than in CAD mode. This menu has the following three options:
1. Maintain. This menu option allows the user to tell the IPC to maintain an
object at a specified value. Once an object is on the IPC's maintain list, the
IPC will attempt to restore power through a functioning redundant path.
An object that is being maintained is highlighted with a green border.
2. Unmaintain. This menu option removes an object from the IPC's main-
tain list.
3. Unfail. This menu option allows the user to tell the IPC to remove an
object from its list of failed objects. The IPC is then able to determine
when previously failed hardware has been corrected. It can then use the
component as a possible path for restoring power to the critical loads.
• The IPC/RT updates the current sensor values whenever the "display measure-
ments" command is processed by the IPC. The value is written over the icon
that represents a current sensor. The user can also type "d m" into the com-
mand window, or press the UPDATE SENSOR VALUES button on the
main menu bar. If the IPC is in the FDIR process, there may be some delay
before receiving the new measurements.
• The IPC/RT also updates the current state of the switches. The IPC/RT also
writes the letter that represents the state onto the left hand side of the icon.
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The letters 'N','F','T', and 'U' denote the switch state as being on, off, tripped,
and unusable respectively.
• A command window is provided to allow the user to directly issue commands
to the IPC in a text format, and is primarily for the use of the IPC developers.
• The IPC/RT utilizes color highlighting to clearly show the objects that are
involved in the FDIR process. All suspects are given a yellow border, and any
failed objects have a red border.
• The Notifier accepts clients that need to communicate with the IPC/RT, such as
the IPC/GMT. Once a client is established, all communications with the client
and the resulting warnings to the user that may occur, are issued by another
parsing routine invoked by Notifier.
By providing these capabilities, the runtime environment is able to provide a fast and
robust method of interaction with the IPC.
6.1.3 Iconic Representation of PMAD Objects
The PMAD images that are supplied to the user were drawn using a public domain
color image drawing and editing tool call pixmap. The graphics format that was used
in this project is the XPM format. This common format allows the user to utilize
any drawing package desired, even an image scanner, as long as the final output is
converted into XPM. This conversion can be done with the Pbm Plus package that
is available on Internet.
An object instance that has no previous icon definitions is given a default image
which the user can interactively change. For example, an RPC is displayed in three
parts: the object itself, a measurement, and a command. The supplied interface has
three images that are positioned next to each other, to give the appear of a single
object, the RPC. Figure 7 shows the three icons that make up the RPC. Future
enhancements would allow the user to specify a single icon for multiple objects, a
group, or to simply group several icons together for easier repositionlng.
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Figure 7: Example Iconic RPC
6.1.4 Frame Data Validation
In the process of parsing the files that define the model, the system is capable of
validating each frame definition. Validation takes the form of a recursive descent
parser. The validation currently performed is only for the syntactic aspects of the
model.
Another step toward the validation of the model lies in the testing for cycles within
the model. This task is relatively trivial due to the design of the IPC/RT, and the
traversal methods have already been defined within the classes.
6.2 Sample Runs
To allow the reader a sense of the IPC user's point of view, this section summarizes
the runtlme session which occurred during the demonstration of the IPC at NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center as part of the requirements of this contract. During the
demonstration, the IPC performed perfectly, and the IPC/RT was able to provide
a fast and easy runtime environment. A more detailed analysis of the tests will be
provided in the next section.
The demonstration consisted of a set of six tests which served to prove the capa-
bilities of the IPC. An additional scenario was accidentally introduced by an inexpe-
rienced user of the IPC/RT, and is also recorded in the playback. The IPC performed
as expected, even though the accidental case had not been attempted previously. The
fact that the user was able to introduce a new scenario shows how easily the IPC can
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be manipulated through the use of the IPC/RT.
The following sections present snapshots of three of the scenarios performed during
the demonstration. The color highlighting of the objects in the snapshots indicate
the following conditions.
• Green An object with a green border is a critical load that is to be maintained
by the IPC. If its current power source fails, the IPC needs to take action to
restore power through a redundant power source.
• Yellow An object with a yellow border indicates that it is a suspect for the
fault(s) detected in the system.
• Red An object with a red border indicates that it is a failed (unusable) com-
ponent and the cause for a fault in the system.
In each of the following scenarios, the critical loads PRPC-30620 (a fan) and
PRPC-30418 (a bank of lights), are being maintained by the IPC. Normally the IPC
is monitoring the system as shown in Figure 8.
6.2.1 Fault with Recovery
In this scenario, a hard fault is placed on Remote Power Controller (RPC) P306,
which is currently the power source for the critical load PRPC-30620. The IPC
begins the FDIR process and indicates the suspects for the fault. Figure 9 shows the
IPC/RT screen. On a color terminal, the suspects are highlighted in yellow.
Once the suspects have been determined, the IPC isolates the cause of the fault.
The IPC fails RPC-P306, and restores power to PRPC-30620 via RPC-S320. Fig-
ure 10 shows the failed component and the new source of power for the critical load.
6.2.2 Fault with Double Recovery
In this scenario, a hard fault is placed on Remote Power Controller (RPC) P3, which
is currently the power source for RPC-P304, RPC-P306, and RPC-P307. RPC-P306
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Figure 8: Monitoring the SSM/PMAD
is the power source for the critical load PRPC-30620, and RPC-P304 is the source
for the critical load PRPC-30418.
The IPC begins the FDIR process and indicates the suspects for the fault. Because
RPC-P3 supply power to RPC-P304, RPC-P306, and RPC-P307, they each trip on
under-voltage. This results in both critical loads losing power. Figure 11 shows the
IPC/RT screen (again, in color, the suspects are highlighted in yellow). Once the
suspects have been determined, the IPC isolates the cause of the fault. The IPC fails
RPC-P3, and restores power to PRPC-30620 via RPC-S320, and also restores power
to PRPC-30418 via RPC-S318. Figure 12 shows the failed component and the new
sources of power for the critical loads.
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Figure 9: Scenario 1: Fault to RPC P306
6.2.3 Multiple Fault without Recovery
In this scenario, hard faults are placed on two RPCs, P303 and P307. These RPC's
are not supplying power to any of the critical loads. The IPC begins the FDIR
process and indicates the suspects for the fault. Figure 13 shows the IPC/RT screen
at this point. Once the suspects have been determined, the IPC isolates the causes of
the faults, and the IPC fails RPC-P303 and RPC-P307. Figure 14 shows the failed
components.
The screen shots presented in this section show the SSM/PMAD model display,
and how it changes during a real runtime session. The playback data used to get
these snapshots was taken from the demonstration given at NASA MSFC. During
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Figure 10: Scenario 1: Failure of RPC-P306 and Power Restored to PRPC-30620
this demonstration, the IPC/RT clearly demonstrated its ability to meet its primary
requirements of being fast and easy to use.
7 Testing the IPC
This section describes the testing undertaken to prove the effectiveness of the IPC in
performing FDIR, using the PMAD testbed.
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Figure 11: Scenario 2: Fault to RPC P3
7.1 Test Scenarios
There was a significant number of tests performed on the IPC, using the PMAD.
Some of these included putting direct short circuits to ground at various locations in
the system, such as on the load side of the lk PRC, and on the load center side of the
3k Remote Power Controllers (RPC's). This type of fault was referred to as a hard
fault, and it required the IPC prototype to recognize the discrepancy in the current
sensor reading, find the "failed" component (usually an RPC), and if opening the RPC
would cause loss of power to a critical load that had a redundant path, to establish
an alternate path by closing the appropriate RPC. The RPC's in the PMAD have
internal sensors that cause them to trip on hard faults; on accumulated overcurrent
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Figure 12: Scenario 2: Failure of RPC-P3 and Power Restored to Critical Loads
over time in cases of lower level faults (I2t), or on undervoltage. The IPC prototype,
therefore, would see the discrepancy not as a difference in current magnitudes, but
rather, as the unexplained opening of a RPC by its internal mechanism. It would
thus only have to establish redundant paths to critical loads.
Another type of test consisted of short circuits to ground through impedances
(called soft faults). The current levels generated by these faults are significantly
lower than that of hard faults, and are thus more insidious. They are, therefore,
difficult for conventional protective devices to detect and protect against because the
level of overcurrent may be below not only the instantaneous trip level of an RPC,
but also below the I2t pickup level where there would be no trip regardless of the
time elapsed. Yet, soft faults can be quite destructive. Since the RPC's would not
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Figure 13: Scenario 3: Fault to RPCs P303 and P307
trip themselves automatically for soft faults, the IPC, in this case, is tasked with
detecting and diagnosing the problem, isolating the fault location (usually the closest
upstream RPC), and initiating recovery action, if such is warranted.
Sensor failures were also simulated by disconnecting the leads on current sensors
being used by the IPC. The action expected of the IPC in this situation was to declare
the sensor to be erroneous and label it as unusable, but allow the rest of the system to
continue normal operation. This represents a difficult task for local relaying schemes,
as well as for the state of the art in global monitoring systems which employ other
artificial intelligence techniques.
Lastly, multiple (two) independent short circuits (hard and soft faults as well as
combinations of both) were placed on the system simultaneously. The prototype was
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Figure 14: Scenario 3: Failure of RPC-P303 and RPC-P307
expected to identify all of the fault conditions, isolate them and initiate recovery
action. This likewise represents a difficult case for local protection schemes as well as
for global monitoring systems that use artificial intelligence techniques.
The hard and soft fault tests were all executed in Load Center 3 due to its inclusion
of redundant loads. No such redundancy was present in the other Load Centers. Tests
on failed sensors, however, were done in Load Center 2 because that is where the
failable sensor was installed. This test consisted of the IPC monitoring the PMAD
while under normal operation for a sufficiently long period of time to establish normal
conditions in the system. Then, the leads to the failable sensor were removed, which
caused it to read zero.
There were two objectives to the test program: a qualitative and a quantitative.
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The qualitative objective was to determine whether in light of the sensor readings
observed, the IPC reached the proper diagnosis and carried out the appropriate cor-
rective action.
The quantitative objective of the tests was to measure the time-to-action of the
test. The time-to-action, as noted earlier, is the time taken by the IPC to complete
the isolation of the failed component, starting from the time the fault was placed.
The results of this quantitative aspect of the test phase were important because, as
noted earlier, in order to represent a usable tool in the real, earth-bound world, the
IPC must have an adequate time-to-action. A suitable time-to-action of the IPC
when fast local tripping capability is available to protect against hard faults (such
as is the case with the PMAD) is in the order of a few seconds (10 to 15). In such
circumstances, the IPC would serve as secondary protection against hard faults and
primary protection against soft faults and sensor failures not normally detected by
the local protection, as well as for the recovery of the system when affected by either
hard or soft faults. If the IPC is to be used as a primary means of protection for
hard faults, however, an adequate time-to-action would have to be in the order of
0.5 to 1.0 second. This is based on the fact that low voltage distribution breakers
in earth-bound power distribution networks have fault clearing times of less than 10
cycles of 60 Hz current. This equates to 0.167 seconds. If additional time is allotted
for data acquisition from sensors, then an upper bound of one half to one second for
a time-to-action would be considered adequate.
The time-to-action, however, can be a misleading measure of the response time
of the IPC itself, since this parameter includes any and all communications network
delays in getting the sensor data from the LLP's to the IPC, as well as relaying the
controlling command from the IPC to the LLP's. There were a total of 13 sets of
tests designed for the evaluation phase of the investigation. Table 1 describes the
general objective of each test. All but one were successfully executed numerous time
(between 10 and 35 times).
Due to the overall symmetry of Load Center 3, and the general objectives of the
tests, the same test was executed on different, but hierarchically and functionally
identical, sets of components in the system. Table 2 describes the components most
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Test Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Test Description
Soft fault in 1K circuit with critical loads maintained
Hard fault in 1K circuit with redundant loads maintained
Soft fault in 3K circuit with redundant loads maintained
Hard fault in 3K circuit with redundant loads maintained
Soft fault in 1K circuit with no recovery
Hard fault in 1K circuit with no recovery
Soft fault in 3K circuit with no recovery
Hard fault in 3K circuit with no recovery
Sensor failure at 1K RPC
Sensor failure at 3K RPC
Multiple faults with no recovery
Multiple faults with two redundant loads maintained
Multiple faults with one redundant load maintained
Table 1: Test Objectives
Test Number Failed Object Isolated Object
1 RPC-P306, CURRENT-RPC-P306 RPC-P306
2 RPC-S320 RPC-S320
RPC-P3
RPC-P3
4 RPC-S3
5 RPC-P306
6 RPC-S316
7
RPC-S3
NOT TESTED
RPC-P3
RPC-S3
RPC-P306
RPC-S316
RPC-P3
RPC-S3
Recovered Object
$320
P306
$318, $320
P3O4, P306
NR
NR
NR
NR
10 CURRENT-RPC-S2 NR NR
11 RPC-P303, RPC-P307 RPC-P303, RPC-P307 NR
12 RPC-S318, RPC-S320 RPC-S318, RPC-S320 P304, P306
13 RPC-P303, RPC-P304 RPC-P303, RPC-P306 $318
Table 2: Example Runs for Fault Tests
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frequently used to carry out each of the tests. The symbol 'NR' indicates 'not re-
quired'. This indicates those tests that did not require either component isolation, or
recovery of redundant loads. Tests 11, 12, and 13 were tested with a combination of
hard and soft faults.
7.2 Test Results
The IPC prototype successfully met its qualitative objectives under all test conditions
executed. Test 9, however, required additional hardware to implement and was not
executed. The tests showed that the IPC prototype was successful in diagnosing the
problem, isolating the fault, and where required, carrying out appropriate control
action. This control action consisted of supplying all redundant loads from alternate
sources. This was true for all 12 cases executed. Furthermore, the IPC testing
confirmed the ability of model-based reasoning to diagnose unexpected failures. As
noted earlier, during one testing session, a casual user improperly opened one of
tile RPC's feeding a redundant critical load (the other RPC, meanwhile was already
open). Since the load had been designated as critical, and thus for a certain level of
current to be maintained to it, the IPC took it upon itself to immediately close the
other RPC, thus re-establishing a power source to the critical load.
The quantitative objective of the test program was to measure the time-to-action
exhibited by the IPC for some of the tests. Table 3 depicts the worst, the best, and
the average times recorded for a series of tests. All times depicted are in seconds.
The number of Tests column of Table 3 represents the total number of times the test
was run successfully. However, timing measurements were not performed for all test
runs. In fact, time-to-action data for tests 5 and 6 result from only one test run, and
should be interpreted with this fact in mind.
It was found that the times-to-action ranged from slightly over 7 seconds to as
much as nearly 34 seconds, with the average being about 10 to 12 seconds. These
times-to-action are considered sufficiently fast for real time deployment to isolate
hard faults in the presence of fast local tripping devices such as found in the PMAD
with the RPC's. Such an arrangement prevents the flow of the high fault currents
that typically result from hard faults. Soft faults, on the other hand, are generally
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Test Number o] Tests
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
II
12
13
Worst Time
Isolate Recovery
30 11.82 2.01
35 11.89 2.02
15 9.47 3.85
20 Time-to-action not measured
30 9.4 NR
30 33.92 NR
15 Time-to-actlon not measured
20 Time-to-action not measured
0 Test not performed
15 8.9
20 14.73 NR
15 Time-to-action not measured
10 Time-to-action not measured
Best Time Average Time
Isolate Recovery Isolate Recovery
10.65 1.45 11.21 1.73
10.39 1.52 10.97 1.78
7.86 1.94 8.93 3.22
9.4 NR 9.4 NR
33.92 NR 33.92 NR
NR 7.4 NR 8.1 NR
10.57 NR 12.80 NR
Table 3: Results of IPC Tests on PMAD Breadboard
not considered to be time critical due to their low current level, thus making those
times-to-action acceptable. The same applies for sensor failures. Since soft faults
and sensor failures are not typically detected by such local protection schemes, the
presence of the IPC provides a significant advantage.
Nevertheless, these times-to-action are not sufficiently fast in the absence of fast
local interrupting devices. Times-to-action of one second or less will be required in
order to make IPC applicable to such duties.
Some of the excessive delay can be attributed to the use of the Internet to exe-
cute the tests remotely from Orlando to Melbourne. In order to quantify this delay,
additional tests were done locally as well as remotely. Test 2 was selected for this
experiment since it is considered to be one of the most common faults in actual power
systems. The objective was to compare run times without any optimization to obtain
a gross representation of the internet delay times. The results are depicted in Table
4. A comparison of the times showed approximately -1/2 to 18 seconds difference
in time-to-action. The worst REMOTE time was obtained in the afternoon (EST)
which is a heavy traffic period for Internet given the start of business hours on the
West Coast.
This result shows that the effect of an Internet delay cannot be determined by
general comparisons of run times. Also, it may show that Internet delays are also
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Test Remote
Best Worst
2 34.97 53.14
Local
With Delay Without Delay
35.54 22.16
Table 4: Speed Comparison of Local vs. Remote Testing
occurring significantly at Huntsville. It should also be noted that the test at NASA-
MSFC was run on a Solbourne while the remote testing was done on a Sun Spare 1+
which is somewhat faster. This may explain the slower time for LOCAL. All times
were compared using the computer clock time elapsed from a discrepancy detection
to a fault isolation and then to a recovery in hundredth's of a second.
A second, and more significant, objective of this comparison was to compare the
running time to a version of the code that was exempt from internal Internet delay
waits that were embedded in the interface code in order to run the IPC remotely. The
other value displayed in Table 4 (Local W/O Delay) gives the runtime obtained when
these delays were removed. This resulted in a significant reduction from 36 seconds
to 22 seconds.
7.3 Summary and Evaluation of Tests
The test results support the following claims:
1. Structure-and-behavior models can be developed for use by a model-based rea-
soner for electrical power system FDIR;
2. These models are robust enough to accurately simulate the behavior of simple
power systems;
3. A model-based diagnoser with the appropriate model, such as the IPC proto-
type, is capable of correctly monitoring a power system, diagnosing and isolating
any electrical faults, and undertake action to cause power flow to be restored
to critical, redundantly-wired loads in a short period of time;
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4. The IPC prototype can potentially react fast enough to be useful in a real-time
application; and
5. The TTA results confirm that the IPC could reside as a ground-based assistant
to mission control engineers performing FDIR on spacecraft, but would probably
be better suited as an on-board assistant to flight personnel.
The time-to-action results are in need of further improvement. Since no special effort
was made to optimize the IPC prototype code beyond the initial translation, we are
optimistic that the goal of a time-to-action of less than one second can be achieved
through further algorithmic and data structure efficiency improvements. From the
test results, it is clear that work in this area should focus on the diagnosis and
isolation portion of the system, since the times required to perform this function were
significantly larger than for the recovery. Lastly, the use of faster platforms, such as
a Sparc-10, will most certainly help in this matter.
Overall, the developers consider the data summarized in this section significant.
However, the tests also served to shed light on several improvements that need to be
made to the prototype in order to commercialize the technology. These are considered
in the final section.
8 Summary and Reflections
The success of any project can be measured in terms of both results obtained and
knowledge gained. The concrete results obtained, summarized in the previous section,
confirmed, in the minds of the developers of the IPC, that a first principles-based
approach to autonomous FDIR for spacecraft power systems is feasible. With the
right enhancements, a system like the the IPC can be used to effectively maintain
and control power distribution for power systems of the size envisioned for future,
long mission spacecraft. As the result of this effort, the developers recommend that
these enhancements consist of one or more of the following:
1. More effective storage management for the knowledge-base, in order to speed
up its access by the reasoner during diagnosis;
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2. A more robust knowledge representation, perhaps consisting of one of the fol-
lowing extensions:
• Developing models of finer granularity, including, for example, a more
detailed model of different loads;
• Incorporation of component fault models;
• Acquisition of expert knowledge to supplement the first principles-based
model, thus resulting in a hybrid system;
• Multiple models based on either structural or behavioral abstraction;
3. Caching of knowledge obtained during the reasoning process, e.g. through ap-
plying techniques like truth maintenance (TMS).
Some of these enhancements are minor; others more substantial. But none imply an
abandonment, or even a major change to, the first-principle-based approach. Future
extensions to the work of the IPC developers will consist of implementing some of
these enhancements.
As noted at the outset, the dual requirements of speed and robustness for the
IPC diagnoser was the major challenge to the success of this project, since these
requirements tend to be mutually inhibiting. To achieve an adequate degree of success
in meeting both requirements, we were led to an approach which relied less on generic
knowledge of power system structure and behavior, and more on knowledge about the
PMAD itself. On the modeling side, we attained an adequate degree of robustness at
the expense of generality: our approach might not easily generalize to power systems
which are larger in size and complexity than the PMAD. This concern will be tested
by future research, when other power system models will be built and tested on the
IPC. On the reasoning side, we were able to attain a greater amount of TTA speed by
replacing a general reasoning strategy, constraint suspension, with one that, again,
relied more on the properties specific to PMAD.
It seems to us, then, that there are two approaches one can take to developing
systems, such as the IPC, which construct and apply models for diagnosis of complex
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systems. One approach is to impart to the diagnostic system a more expressive knowl-
edge representation and reasoning device than was originally proposed by researchers
in model-based reasoning, who focused their attention on less complex devices. The
other approach, which was taken here, is to augment the original structure and behav-
ior representation (as implemented in KATE) by different kinds of knowledge about
components. This knowledge may be classified as heuristic by some, although we
prefer not to use this term, since it is commonly associated with purely experiential
knowledge of the expert, whereas the knowledge we incorporated may be a bit more
generic. We chose not to incorporate fault models into the system, although, if this
second alternative is to be developed further, this might also be considered.
Our current intent is to develop the first alternative further, to expand upon
the original model-based knowledge representation for dealing with more complex
devices. We currently feel that solving the problem of developing structure and be-
havior models for complex systems such as power systems will involve applying the
idea of behavioral abstraction. Recall that the behavioral complexity of a system is
measured mathematically in terms of its algebraic transfer function, and physically in
terms of the complexity of causal dependency relationships among the components.
We hypothesize that this complexity can be managed by abstracting on the basis of
different aspects of the system. By aspects (of electrical power) we mean things like
voltage, current, state (open, closed or tripped), impedance, temperature, etc. They
are things that are outputs of or inputs to the device. The circuit equations provide
examples of what we term aspect models. Each aspect model provides a complete
description of one aspect of the system's behavior. The dependency relationships
among components within an aspect model are invariably simpler than among com-
ponents within the complete model (i.e., the model within which all the aspects are
represented). The complete model can be recovered by running each model in paral-
lel, noting that the aspect models mutually constrain one another behaviorally. Thus,
aspect models provide a modular representation of behavioral complexity. Developing
this extension to the first-principles representation of knowledge is a current focus of
our research.
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Figure 15: Main Menu Bar
Appendix: Using the IPC
This appendix provides a comprehensive guide to all functions available to the user,
as well as a brief guide for future IPC programmers.
9.1 Starting the IPC and Using the Menus
To start the IPC, just type the name of the executable file, viz. ipcrt.
The IPC has several menu options that provide easy control of the runtime en-
vironment, and for model modifications. The following disucssion summarizes the
functions of each menu option.
The main menu, as shown in Figure 15, consists of the following options:
• The File button, located on the left-most upper corner of the window provides
the following selections:
- Exit - if a runtime session is active, it will terminate the session,
- Save Model - a copy of the original frame files being used will be saved,
and the current model will be saved into the same files from which they
were loaded.
- Load Model - this selection performs the following:
1. if changes to the current model have been made but have not been
saved, the user will be prompted to optionally save the current model,
and
2. the user will be prompted for the file(s) that are to be loaded. Normal
Unix pattern matching is accepted.
• The mode button provides two options that changes the operation of the IPC.
By default, the system is in Edit mode. When a runtime session is started, it
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automatically switches to runtime mode, thus locking out all editing functions.
The user has the option of switching between modes during a runtime session.
- Edit Model - the default mode that provides CAD-like operations.
- Runtime Mode - returns to the runtime mode of operation.
• There are several runtime control functions available under this menu:
- Start IPC - this selection spawns the IPC process, and switches from the
Edit mode to the Runtime mode.
- Restart IPC - this selection will terminate the current IPC process, and
respawn it.
- Terminate IPC - this selection terminates the runtime session.
- Show Command Window
- Show Main Window
- Show Recovery Window
- Show Warning Window
These selections bring their respective windows to the foreground. Often
these windows can be obscured by other windows that are active, and this
provides an easy way of accessing them.
• Update Sensor Values is a runtime function that sends the display measure-
ments command to the IPC. This provides an easy way of updating the screen
without direct user interaction with the IPC through the Command Window.
Each object on the display has two menus associated with it, depending on the
mode of the system. Figure 16 shows the menu available while in the Edit Mode.
• The Edit Icon(s) selection will display a dialog box which provides the user
the ability to modify the icons and their attributes.
The Edit Connection(s) selection will display a dialog box which provides
the user the ability to modify the connections and attributes of the object. See
Section Edit Connections Dialog Box for details.
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• Hide Object and Connection(s) This selection will cause the object to not
be displayed, as well as any connections associated with it.
When the user is in the Runtime Mode, there is a different menu available, as
shown below in Figure 17.
The Maintain selection will issue a command to the IPC to maintain this
object. The user will also be prompted for a value to maintain the object at.
An object that is to be maintained will have a green border around it.
The Unmaintain selection will issue a command to the IPC to remove the
object from its maintain list. The border of the object will also return to the
color of the background.
The Unfail selection will issue a command to the IPC to remove the object
from its failed list. The border of the object will also return to the color of the
background.
The Edit Icons Dialog Box (Figure 18) depicts the dialog box the user is given.
This provides an interactive method way of modifying the icons and their attributes.
With this dialog box, one is able to add, delete, and modify icons and their attributes.
The list box at the top of the figure shows the currently defined icons for this object.
They are labelled Closed Switch and Open Switch. If a line is selected within
this list, the values in the attribute fields will change to correspond to each icon. The
currently selected icon definition is the Closed Switch. Beneath this list box is a
pulldown list box called Available Icons which provides a list of icons as defined in
the database file. There is also a button labelled ADD TO LIST which will put the
currently selected icon in the Available Icons list into the upper definitions box.
Some default values are supplied for a new entry. Beneath the list box are other fields
that are related to this object definition:
• Default Icon. If checked, this button indicates that this icon is the default
icon displayed when the model is first loaded. If there is no default defined, the
Unknown icon is used.
9 APPENDIX: USING THE IPC 49
Upper Bound,Lower Bound. These two fields define the upper and lower
bounds for a Value Driven icon. Value Driven icons allow the user to define
multiple icons, which will change during a runtime session. This can simulate
a "tank" as well, if enough entries are defined.
• The field Control Function Value is for state driven objects, and contains
the value to be sent to the IPC process, in order to proceed to the next state.
• Caption. This field contains the text that is to be displayed near the icon,
according to the orientation specified.
• Foreground Color,Background Color. These two menus provide the user
with colors that can be used in displaying the caption of the selected icon.
Label Orientation. The four selections available are left, right, above, and
below, which indicate where the caption should be placed relative to the icon
itself. The default placement is below the icon.
Preview Icon Layout. This button will allow the user to see what their
definition will look like, in a separate window, without making the changes
permanent.
Also, at the bottom of the list box are two other buttons:
• Accept Changes. Selecting this button will save the changes made, and will
close the dialog box.
• Cancel Selecting this button will discard any changes made, and will close the
dialog box.
Figure 19 depicts the Edit Connections dialog box. This menu provides an in-
teractive method of modifying the objects' connections and their attributes. The
topmost list box contains the connections define for the currently selected object.
Each connection has the following attributes:
• Connection Visible. This boolean field indicates if the user wants the selected
connection to be seen on the display.
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• Connection Width. The user may change the width of the drawn line of a
connection with this field. A slide bar is also provided for input. A connection
can be 1 to 10 pixels in width.
• Color of Line. The user may change the color of the drawn line of a connection
with this list box. The current colormap is read into this list, thus some entries
have numerical entries instead of text.
Also, at the bottom of the list box are two other buttons:
• Accept Changes. Selecting this button will save the changes made, and will
close the dialog box.
,, Cancel. Selecting this button will discard any changes made, and will close
the dialog box.
9.2 Building IPC/RT
This section provides future IPC/RT programmers with information about building
the IPC/RT, and possible problem areas discovered.
In order to build this system, you need access to the SpiderWeb utilities, and
have the public domain XPM libraries available. You also need a C++ compiler,
preferably GNU, but others may work as well. Currently the IPC/RT is only guar-
anteed to work with the GNU C++ compiler version 2.4.5.
There is a make file provided with the source code. Once located inside the source
code directory, type: make. The system compiles cleanly on a Spare 2, and a Spare
10 with g++.
It should be noted that although it is possible to automatically send the display
measurements command to the IPC, it is presently not advisable. The IPC reads
the current measurements from the hardware whenever it receives the display mea-
surements command. The problem lies in the amount of time it take for the IPC
to retrieve the measurements from the hardware, and the time it takes to send this
information to the IPCRT. During this time interval, the IPC is not able to monitor
the system.
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One suggestion has been made to not ask for the current measurements of the
testbed, but to actually send only the last poll taken by the IPC. This would solve
this problem, but communication delays are still introduced by the request.
Optimally, the 1-PC should automate this by sending only the changes that have
occurred since the last request, instead of the whole system. Once this is done, the
RUNTIME:Update Sensor Values button can be removed from the menu bar.
REFERENCES 52
References
[1] Anderson, P. "Space Station Common Module Network Topology and Hardware
Environment", Martin Marietta Astronomics Group, Final Report, 1990.
[2] Chu, B. "Representing binary relations at multiple levels of abstraction" in
Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, 4(. Z. Ras (ed), North-Holland, 1989.
[3] Dague, P., Deves, P., Luciani, P., and Tallibert, P., "Analog System Diagnosis",
reprinted in (Hamscher, 1991).
[4] Davis, R. "Diagnostic Reasoning Based on Structure and Behavior" Artificial
Intelligence, Vol. 24, No.3, 1984, pp. 347-410.
[5] Davis, R., and Hamscher, W., "Model-based Reasoning: Troubleshooting",
reprinted in [17], pp. 3-24.
[6] deKleer, J. and Williams, B.C., "Diagnosing Multiple Faults" Artificial Intelli-
gence, Vol. 32, No.l, 1987, pp. 97-130.
[7] deKleer, J., "Focusing on Probable Diagnosis", in Hamscher, W., Console, L. and
deKleer, J., Readings in Model-based Diagnosis, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers,
1992, pp. 131-137.
[8] de Kleer, J,, Mackworth, A. K., Reiter, R., "Characterizing Diagnoses and
Faults", Artificial Intelligence, 56, 1992, pp. 197-221.
[9] Director, S.W., Circuit Theory: A Computational Approach. John Wiley and
Sons, 1975.
[10] Dugal-Whitehead, N. R., "The Continuing Development of Poweer System Au-
tomation Knowledge", Proceedings of the Intersociety Energy Conversion Engi-
neering Conference, 1993.
[11] Dugal-Whitehead, N. R., "Results of an Electical Power System Fault Study",
CDDF Final Report No. N06, NASA Tech Paper 3413.
REFERENCES 53
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
Fesq, L., Stephan, A., and McNamee, L., "Modeling Power Systems for Diagno-
sis: How Good is Good Enough?", Proceedings of the 27th Intersociety Energy
Conversion Engineering Conference, San Diego, CA, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 203-208.
Genesereth, M., "The Use of Design Descriptions in Automated Diagnosis", Ar-
tificial Intellignce, 24, 1, 1984.
Gholdston, E. W., Janik, D. F., and Lane, G., "A Diagnostic Expert System for
Space-based Electrical Power Networks", Proceedings of the Intersociety Energy
Conversion Engineering Conference, 1988.
Giunchiglia, F. and Walsh, T., "A Theory of Abstraction", Artificial Intelligence,
57,2-3, 1992, pp. 323-390.
Gonzalez, A. J., Osborne, R. L., Kemper, C., and Lowenfeld, S., "On-line diag-
nosis of turbine-generators using artificial intelligence", IEEE Transactions on
Energy Conversion, Volume EC-1, Number 2, June 1986, pp. 68-74.
Hamscher, W., Console, L., de Kleer, J., eds. Readings in Model-Based Diagnosis.
Morgan Kaufmann, 1991.
Hester, T., "FIES-II: A Real Time Fault Isolation Expert System", Proceedings
of the Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, 1986.
Knowledge-based Autonomous Test Engineer: Software Description and Project
Overview, NASA Document, 1991.
Kelly, J., "Diagnosis by constraint propagation in math models" in Workshop
Notes from AAAI-90 on Constraint-directed Reasoning, 1990.
Konolige, K., "Abduction vs. Closure in Causal Theories", Artificial Intelligence,
1992, Vol. 53, No. 3.
Kuipers, B. "Qualitative simulation" Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 29, No.3, Sept.
1986.
REFERENCES 54
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[3o]
[31]
[32]
Lackinger, F., aand Nejdl, W., "Diamon: A Model-based Troubleshooter based
on Qualitative Reasoning", IEEE Expert, February 1993.
Leitch, R. R., Chantler, M. J., Shen, Q., and Coghill, G. M., "A Preliminary
Specification Methodology for Model-based Diagnosis", in Working Notes of DX-
93, The Fourth International Workshop on Principles of Diagnosis, Aberystwyth,
Wales, 1993, pp. 11-31.
Leitch, R., Shen, Q., "Finding Faults With Model Based Diagnosis", Proceedings
of the Second International Workshop on the Principles of Diagnosis, 1991.
Lollar, L., Weeks, D.J., "The autonomously managed power systems laboratory",
Proceedings of the 23th IECEC, Denver, Colorado, Vol.3, 1988.
Lloyd, B., Park, W., White, J., and Divakaruni, M., "A Generator Expert Mon-
itoring System,, Proceedings of the Conference on Expert System Applications
for the Electric Power Industry, Orlando, FL, June 1989.
Morris, R., Gonzalez, A., et. al., "A model-based fault diagnostic and control
system for spacecraft power" in Proceedings of the 27th IECEC, San Diego, CA,
1992, VOl.1, pp. 165-170.
Mozetic, I., "Hierarchical Model-based Diagnosis". Reprinted in (Hamscher,
1991).
Ng, H.T."Model-based, Multiple-fault Diagnosis of Dynamic, Continuous Phys-
ical Devices". IEEE Expert, December 1991, pp. 38-43.
Priest, C. and Wellman, B. "Modeling Bridge Faults for Diagnosis in Electronic
Circuits", in Hamscher, W., (ed.) Working Notes of the First International Work-
shop on the Principles of Diagnosis, 1990, pp. 69-74.
Reiter, R., "A Theory of Diagnosis From First Principles", Artificial Intelligence,
Vol. 32, No.l, 1991, pp. 57-96.
REFERENCES 55
[33]
[34]
[35]
[3G]
[37]
[38]
Russell, B. D., and Watson, K., "Power Substation Automation Using
Knowledge-Based Systems", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, October
1987, pp. 1090-1098.
Scarl, E. "Multi-Level Diagnosis in Model-based Reasoning", Boeing Computing
Services, Technical Report BCS-G2010-119, 1993.
Spier, R. J., and Liffring, M. E., "Real-Time Expert Systems for Advanced
Power Control", Proceedings of the [nterscociety Energy Conversion Engineering
Conference, 1988.
Struss, P., and Dressier, O., "Physical Negation: Introducing Fault Models into
the General Diagnostic Engine", Proceedings IJCAI-89, Detroit, MI 1989, pp.
1318-1323.
Struss, P. "What's in SD? Towards a theory of modeling for diagnosis", in [17],
pp. 419-450.
Watson, K., Russell, B. D., and Hackler, I., "Expert System Structures for Fault
Detection in Spaceborne Power Systems", Proceedings of the [ntersociety Energy
Conversion Engineering Conference, 1988.
REFERENCES 56
i::::>:::::::::_s_4f.:.::::_.:_-_.:.:*_:;_. :;_:_:._.:_:_:._:_.`:._i_#_.;:._.;.:_.f_,:_:_N_i_._i_}i_;_i_ii!_#i.i._.:I
:::-:_.::i-:.:':::s';i".":i-:.::i:.::i:::i'./-:::::::-:!:_:;''':" "tt:-":':i:'::""'::: ":':?_t[:":'_:::::_:'¢-'::':'::-:" "::" :...:::::.::_ . (... -...:::+:...,::_E_!:
!
Figure 16: Edit Object Menu
i:_:-:.:-,.-:.::::i:i__ -:i:i-:i--:_.i,.'_::.;:i_-.:- ._._$:?.,:..-:_-i_:!_-:-i:-:,:i.:i-- -i_.':
-::'i.-i"i_!_":::i::ii_s::Y_iN.'.::;.'.:.".:_"_ 'i:"!;._i ' -_i_i_%i
:::::-:_:::-,_-_xo:_._:-',-'/.4.*:'-*__ _i- '--::::::::-::-:--::::::::
_:,.:_::-_,:..i:j_-_:.:_:y_]:_ fro, ,,x. _ _ _,_:.-.*...,:-._._,-_..-.:.-_...-.::.:._|
i]_::_:'.-_.i::;.!:':-:-:--:.:_:_::-:"-_g.-;_:_: ':: ._.;:.}..:_:i].:::..-ii]..:i::]-i]i]i_:i.:-:._::,?:: :, ":"
............. _:.: __ ...................:s;'_.-_
:_;:':':':':': :': ":'"_ "'_:" : _":'-- ;-::".'::.:-:_i';-x-:-:-:-:-:-x.:-x-:-:-:-:-:f:::2"
_::...................._,::.,.i_.i-::---::.-:::.'::::::::-::.-._...'_
_ _.. ........._: ..i...:.._.:...:.`.:.:.,..::.:._s_.:_.!_:!._._.!_:..:....::::::..::_._.:..::_:!:.:::.._...ii:_`:.:_i}#_
_:-:_::_::::::_:_._.:.'::_]..?_?-_-7_:i..'.__.':!::':-_::'::'_;_:_ _i
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Figure 17: Runtime Object Menu
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